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Abstract 
Research on the intra-institutional consequences of differences in the EU’s inter-institutional rule 
configurations is rare. This study investigates the effect of the empowerment of the European 
Parliament (EP) on the active involvement of ministers in Council decision-making. I argue that 
the empowerment of the EP increases the incentives for bureaucrats in the Council’s preparatory 
bodies to refer decisions on legislative dossiers to ministers. The empirical analysis examines this 
argument with data on more than 6000 legislative decision-making processes that were concluded 
between 1980 and the end of 2007. The analysis demonstrates a strong and robust association 
between the type of legislative procedure and different decision-making levels in the Council: a 
more powerful EP leads to more politicized Council decision-making. In terms of the legitimacy 
of EU decision-making, this finding implies that empowering the EP does not only create a direct 
link  between  EU  lawmaker  and  ordinary  citizens,  but  also  contributes  to  strengthening  the 
indirect link between Council members and their national electorates. 
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The EP and Council in EU law-making 
Over the last three decades, the European Parliament (EP) has gained substantial law-making 
powers. The EP’s original role was to be a purely consultative body in the legislative decision-
making process of the European Union (EU), giving advice to the Commission and the Council 
of  Ministers.  While  the  Commission  was,  and  still  is,  responsible  for  drafting  legislative 
proposals, the Council, as the institution representing member states’ interests, used to be the 
only institution whose agreement was required to pass EU law. From its humble beginnings as an 
advisory  body,  the  Parliament  has  developed  into  a  fully-fledged  legislative  institution  with 
prerogatives that in many respects equal those of the Council (see e.g. Rittberger 2005).  
Not  surprisingly,  the  rather  extraordinary  transformation  of  the  EP  has  caught  the 
attention of a number of scholars studying this process. Corresponding to the elevation of the 
Parliament’s role in the legislative decision-making process, research on its internal workings and 
its  external  influence  has  flourished  in  recent  years  (e.g.  Kreppel  2002a;  Hix  et  al.  2007). 
However, little research exists that examines the consequences of the empowerment of the EP on 
decision-making  within  the  other  major  institutions  involved  in  EU  law-making.  This  study 
investigates whether and to what extent the increase in Parliament’s legislative powers led to a 
politicization of Council decision-making. In this paper, politicization refers to the degree to 
which an issue receives the attention of high-ranking political decision-makers. In the Council of 
the European Union, only ministers from member state governments have the legal authority to 
adopt legislative decisions. However, ministers are often not directly involved in the substantive 
negotiations on a dossier and just rubber-stamp the agreement reached by bureaucrats in so-called 
preparatory bodies of the Council. Thus, the majority of legislative proposals adopted by the 
Council are never brought to the attention of ministers (van Schendelen 1996; Hayes-Renshaw & 
Wallace 2006; Häge 2008).    
The  lack  of  active  involvement  of  ministers  in  Council  decision-making  has  obvious 
implications for the legitimacy of the decisions adopted by this institution. Proponents of the 
current constitutional structure of the EU argue that Council decisions are no less legitimate than 
decisions by the European Parliament, given that member state governments are accountable to 
their national populaces (Moravcsik 2002). However, this accountability link gets stretched and 
becomes brittle when Council decisions are made by officials from national ministries rather than   3 
ministers themselves. The work in Council working parties and committees usually takes place 
outside the limelight. In any event, officials do not answer directly to national parliaments. I 
argue that the empowerment of the EP politicizes decision-making within the Council. If this 
hypothesis holds, then granting the EP legislative powers increases the EU’s legitimacy not only 
directly by empowering the institution that represents European citizens, but also indirectly by 
strengthening  the  accountability  link  between  ministers  in  the  Council  and  their  national 
parliaments and electorates.  
In this paper, I examine the consequences of granting legislative powers to the EP for the 
involvement of ministers in Council decision-making. The literature review in the next section 
establishes that the effect of EP empowerment on decision-making within the Council has not 
received much attention yet. In the subsequent section, I elaborate on the theoretical mechanism 
linking EP involvement with the decision-making level in the Council. Somewhat simplified, the 
theoretical  argument  states  that  the  introduction  of  politically  contested  issues  and  extreme 
positions and the increase in the level of public and political awareness that accompanies the 
empowerment  of  the  EP  discourages  national  officials  from  making  Council  decisions 
themselves. Being primarily motivated by blame-avoidance, national officials are more likely to 
refer decisions to ministers when the chances of bureaucrats making and ministers discovering 
‘wrong’  working  party  or  committee  decisions  increase.  This  simple  model  yields  a  clear 
hypothesis about the effect of EP empowerment on the level of politicization of Council decision-
making.  
Following the outline of the theory, I describe the sample, data and methods employed for 
the empirical analysis. The analysis is based on a sample of more than 6000 legislative decision-
making cases. The sample covers the period between 1980 and 2007 and includes legislative acts 
adopted  according  to  the  consultation,  cooperation  or  codecision  procedure.  The  main 
explanatory variable in this study is the type of legislative procedure and the response variable 
indicates the level at which the Council decided on the proposal. The empirical analysis uses bi- 
and multivariate statistical techniques to examine the association between these variables. After 
the research methods section, I present the results of the statistical analyses. The findings show a 
clear,  substantively  and  statistically  significant  relationship  between  the  type  of  legislative 
procedure and different Council decision-making levels. Thus, the results of the data analysis are   4 
in line with the expectations derived from the theoretical model. In the last section, I summarize 
the study and its findings and discuss possible normative conclusions.  
Previous research 
Research on the EP’s internal functioning and external influence has been a burgeoning field in 
recent years. Thus, this review cannot claim comprehensiveness. Regarding the internal workings 
of the EP, several studies have analysed the voting behaviour of members of the EP (Kreppel & 
Tsebelis  1999;  Hix  et  al.  2007).  Amongst  other  topics,  these  studies  examined  coalition 
formation,  party  group  cohesion,  and  the  relative  influence  of  national  parties  compared  to 
European  party  groups.  The  Parliament’s  system  of  standing  committees  has  also  received 
considerable  attention  (Bowler  &  Farrell  1995;  Mamadouh  &  Raunio  2003;  Whitaker  2005; 
McElroy 2006). The degree of representativeness of committees compared to the full plenary has 
been a major issue of concern in this area of research. Rasmussen (2008a) conducted a similar 
study of the representativeness of the EP’s delegation to the conciliation committee under the 
codecision procedure. A number of other studies have examined the selection and influence of 
rapporteurs, who are responsible for drafting committee reports (Kaeding 2004; Benedetto 2005; 
Kaeding 2005; Hausemer 2006; Hoyland 2006).  Finally, Ringe (2005)  examined the internal 
preference formation process of the EP. 
Accompanying the increase in legislative powers of the EP, many studies have focused on 
the effect of this empowerment on policy outcomes. Early contributions in this field took a purely 
theoretical  perspective  on  the  effects  of  different  legislative  procedures  (Steunenberg  1994; 
Tsebelis 1994; Crombez 1996). The first generation of empirical studies used the adoption of EP 
amendments to gauge the Parliament’s influence in EU decision-making (Kreppel 1999; Tsebelis 
et al. 2001; Kreppel 2002b; see also Häge & Kaeding 2007; Kardasheva 2009). Most of the more 
recent  work  attempts  to  capture  the  substantive  difference  made  by  the  EP  through  direct 
measurement  of  policy  outcomes  and  negotiation  positions  on  an  issue  dimension  (Selck  & 
Steunenberg 2004; Thomson et al. 2006; König et al. 2007). Besides the relative influence of the 
different institutions on policy outcomes, other aspects of the inter-institutional decision-making 
process  have  also  been  examined.  Recently,  the  causes  and  consequences  of  informal 
negotiations  and  early  agreements  under  the  codecision  procedure  have  received  growing 
attention (Farrell & Héritier 2003, 2004; Rasmussen 2008b).   5 
With the exception of Farrel and Héritier (2004), no previous study has discussed the 
intra-institutional  consequences  of  inter-institutional  rule  changes.  These  authors  argue  that 
“exogenous  changes  in  macro-institutional  rules,  which  result  in  a  move  from  formal  and 
sequential to informal simultaneous interaction between collective actors, will lead to changes in 
individual actors’ respective influence over outcomes within organizations”  (Farrell & Héritier 
2004:  1208).  Specifically,  informal  simultaneous  interactions  are  supposed  to  advantage 
individuals that control information flows between the collective actors. With respect to the EU, 
the increasing reliance  on informal negotiations between the institutions to come to an early 
agreement under the codecision procedure is a case in point. These informal negotiation practices 
are  hypothesized  to  increase  the  influence  and  power  of  those  individuals  that  are  directly 
involved in the negotiations at the expense of the other members of their institution who are not 
involved. The  argument in this paper is similar to Farrel and Héritier’s (2004) in that inter-
institutional  rule  changes  are  expected  to  result  in  intra-institutional  power  shifts.  However, 
Farrel and Héritier (2004) focus on the development and effect of informal negotiation practices 
within the codecision procedure while this paper compares the effects of different legislative 
procedures.  The  theoretical  expectations  also  differ  considerably.  Based  on  their  theoretical 
argument, Farrel and Héritier (2004) expect an increase in the power of the Presidency vis-à-vis 
other member states and of Council committees vis-à-vis ministers. In contrast, the theoretical 
argument advanced in this study leads to the expectation that an increase in EP powers leads to 
more rather than less ministerial power in Council decision-making.
2 
The brief review of research on the EP and its role in inter-institutional decision-making 
shows that the effect of EP empowerment on decision-making in the Council has received little 
attention. Research that focuses on decision-making within the Council does not fare much better 
in this respect. A number of studies investigate the voting behaviour of member states (Mattila & 
Lane 2001; Mattila 2004). Others study preference alignments (Selck 2004; Thomson et al. 2004; 
Zimmer et al. 2005) of member states or the communication and cooperation networks existing in 
working  parties  and  committees  (Beyers  &  Dierickx  1997,  1998;  Naurin  2008).  A  common 
concern  of  all  of  these  studies  is  the  identification  of  conflict  structures  underlying  Council 
                                                 
2 Note that the two arguments are not necessarily inconsistent. A relatively high ministerial involvement under the 
codecision procedure, as compared to the consultation procedure, might be partly but not completely offset by the 
developing practice of reaching early agreements through informal negotiations with the EP.   6 
decision-making. Lewis (1998, 2003, 2005) conducted qualitative research on the negotiation 
behaviour  in  Council  committees,  especially  the  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives 
(Coreper). The role of the Presidency in Council decision-making has also received considerable 
attention (Tallberg 2003, 2004; Schalk et al. 2007; Warntjen 2007; Thomson 2008). All of these 
studies do not distinguish between different organizational levels and therefore do not inform us 
about the hierarchical division of labour within the Council.  
The studies by Fouilleux and colleagues (2005) and Häge (2007a, b) are more relevant as 
they explicitly deal with the question of why some decisions are made in working parties and 
committees while others are referred to ministers. The argument is often made that bureaucrats 
deal with the ‘technical’ issues while ministers handle the ‘political’ problems. Based on findings 
from qualitative case studies, Fouilleux et al. (2005) challenge this perception. They argue that no 
clear-cut, objective distinction exists between technical and political issues. Whether or not an 
issue is considered to be of a political nature is a result of social construction rather than certain 
characteristics of the dossier. Relying on an analysis of quantitative data, Häge (2007a) comes to 
partly  different  conclusions.  According  to  this  study,  a  large  amount  of  the  variation  in 
ministerial involvement can indeed be traced back to basic characteristics of the proposal under 
consideration. Still, objective characteristics of the dossier do not completely determine the level 
of decision-making in the Council, context factors and the outcomes of social interactions affect 
the  decision  to  involve  ministers  as  well.  Häge  (2007a,  b)  also  studied  the  effect  of  EP 
involvement on the Council decision-making level. Based on different samples and measures of 
EP power, both studies find a positive effect on ministerial involvement. However, the findings 
are based on samples covering relatively limited time periods. Thus, the generalizability of the 
results  is  questionable.  This  study  improves  on  earlier  research  by  extending  the  timeframe 
during which the relationship between legislative procedure and decision-making level in the 
Council is considered. At least equally important, this study clarifies the theoretical link between 
EP  involvement  and  Council  decision-making  level.  The  next  section  elaborates  on  this 
connection. 
Linking EP power and ministerial involvement in Council decision-making 
Before the Single European Act amended the Treaty of Rome in 1987, European laws were 
mostly adopted through the consultation procedure. According to this procedure, legislation is   7 
proposed  by  the  Commission  and  decided  upon  by  the  Council.  The  Parliament  has  only  a 
consultative function. The Council cannot adopt legislation before the Parliament has delivered 
its opinion, but the Council is under no obligation to take any of the Parliament’s amendments 
into account. The Single European Act introduced the cooperation procedure. The cooperation 
procedure added another reading to the consultation procedure. The Council adopts a common 
position by qualified majority in its first reading and sends it back to the Parliament. The EP has 
the opportunity to make amendments to the common position, adopt or reject it. If it rejects the 
common position, or if it makes amendments that are subsequently adopted by the Commission, 
the Council can overrule the Parliament’s suggestions only by unanimity. Tsebelis (1994) has 
argued  that  this  procedure  confers  conditional  agenda-setting  power  to  the  EP.  Still,  if  the 
Council position enjoys unanimous consent among member states, the Council is not bound to 
incorporate any of the Parliament’s amendments. 
In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht added yet another procedure to the repertoire. The so-
called  codecision  procedure  consists  of  three  readings  with  a  conciliation  stage  between  the 
second and third one. If the Council cannot accept all amendments made by the EP in second 
reading, a conciliation committee has to be convened. This committee consists of equally sized 
delegations from the Parliament and the Council. The committee’s task is to find a compromise 
solution.  If  it  does  not  reach  an  agreement,  the  act  falls
3.  If  it  reaches  an  agreement,  the 
compromise text still has to be adopted by both parent institutions in the third reading. While the 
cooperation procedure increases the influence of the Parliament as compared to the consultation 
procedure, only the codecision procedure establishes the Parliament as an equal co-legislator next 
to the Council. Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam extended the scope of the applicability of the 
codecision procedure considerably. This extension included almost all areas previously covered 
by the cooperation procedure.  
                                                 
3 The first version of the codecision procedure, as introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, allowed the Council to re-
introduce its common position in third reading if the conciliation committee did not find a compromise. The Council 
could essentially make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Parliament at the end of the procedure. In practice, this 
provision was irrelevant as the Parliament committed itself through a change in its internal rules of procedure to 
categorically  reject  any  common  position  re-introduced  by  the  Council.  The  second  version  of  the  codecision 
procedure introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 merely formalized the way the procedure had been 
working already during the years before (Hix 2002).   8 
Successive Treaty reforms strengthened the powers of the EP both in kind and scope. 
What consequences does the EP’s empowerment have for Council decision-making? When the 
EP  has  only  a  consultative  function,  national  officials  in  the  Council  can  work  in  relative 
insulation from political and public scrutiny. Exceptions not withstanding (see Kardasheva 2009), 
the opinion of the EP is hardly taken into account by the Council. In accordance with this minor 
role in the decision-making process, interest groups do not consider the EP to be a serious access 
point and the EP’s proceedings receive little coverage by the media. Without substantial law-
making powers, the EP is not considered to be a serious player and its activities are not able to 
generate  much  publicity.  The  cooperation  procedure  and  especially  the  codecision  procedure 
change this situation. The EP is an influential actor under these procedures. The Parliament has 
enough leverage to be heard by national bureaucrats and politicians. The Parliament’s views are 
taken  seriously;  interest  groups  try  to  influence  them  to  suit  their  purposes  and  the  media 
transmits them to a wider audience. Thus, EP empowerment means that the Parliament’s views 
have to be taken into account by the other actors in the legislative decision-making process and, 
as a result, they receive attention from a wider audience. Both of these interrelated aspects of EU 
empowerment are likely to lead to a politicization of Council decision-making. 
To clarify the link between EP empowerment and Council decision-making, I present a 
simple model of the reasoning process of national officials working in Council committees. For 
the purposes of this paper, the basic choice for officials consists of whether or not to involve 
ministers  in  decision-making.  The  Council  is  hierarchically  structured.  At  the  bottom  of  the 
hierarchy, numerous working parties composed of experts from national ministries first discuss 
the details of a dossier. Coreper then constitutes the middle layer of the hierarchy. One formation 
of Coreper consists of the ambassadors of member states to the EU and the other formation 
consists of their deputies. Finally, the ministers in their different sectoral configurations form the 
top of the hierarchy. If any of the lower levels of the hierarchy reaches complete agreement on a 
dossier, it is not further discussed at higher levels. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the Council 
acts somewhat like a filter for legislative proposals. Because I am interested in the extent of 
ministerial  involvement,  I  neglect  the  difference  between  the  two  bureaucratic  levels  of  the 
Council  and  focus  on  the decision  of  a ‘typical’  Coreper member  to  involve  his  minister  in 
decision-making. In the following description of the model, I simply refer to the Coreper member 
generically as ‘the bureaucrat’.   9 
I assume that bureaucrats are primarily motivated by blame avoidance or, in more positive 
terms, they just want to do ‘a good job’. In hierarchical organizations like government ministries, 
doing a good job means delivering the results most preferred by the bureaucrat’s superior. The 
head of a hierarchical organization is in direct control of many of the goods most valued by her 
subordinates, like promotions, salary raises or even just continuing employment. Thus, I assume 
that the preferences of bureaucrats and their ministers are rather closely aligned and that the risk 
of  moral  hazard  on  behalf  of  bureaucrats  does  not  play  a  significant  role  in  explaining  the 
involvement of ministers.
4 In technical terms, I assume that the utility received by the bureaucrat 
from the results of various courses of action is a direct function of the utility received by his 
minister. More precisely, the utility functions take the following form: 
UMinister = -|P-M|-c 
UBureaucrat = -d(|P-M|-c) 
where P∈ {A = 0, B = 1} stands for the policy adopted by the Council and M ∈ {A = 0, B = 1} 
for the policy most preferred by the minister. For simplicity, I consider only two possible policy 
options A and B with values 0 and 1, respectively. The costs for the minister of negotiating 
herself  are  captured  by  c,  which  stands  for  a  positive,  real  number.  The  dummy  variable 
d ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not the minister is aware of the policy outcome P. The utility 
functions take their maxima at zero. Thus, the minister is most happy when she realizes her most 
preferred policy without the need to become personally involved. Then both the term |P-M| and 
the cost variable c are zero. This situation is also one of the outcomes most favoured by the 
bureaucrat. However, for the bureaucrat, any other outcome of which the minister is not aware of 
yields the same payoff. In these situations, d is zero. The bureaucrat is not intrinsically motivated 
to achieve the result most favoured by his minister. The bureaucrat only actively pursues the 
minister’s goals as long as a chance exists that the minister becomes aware of the policy outcome 
(Prob[d = 1] > 0). If the bureaucrat can rule out this possibility, he becomes indifferent between 
different policy options. In this sense, the bureaucrat is politically neutral. Figure 1 describes the 
sequence of interaction between the bureaucrat and the minister. 
                                                 
4 This assumption contrasts with standard principal-agent models, which consider preference divergence between 
principals and agents to be a major limitation regarding the extent of delegation.   10 
Figure 1: Sequence of interaction between bureaucrat and minister 
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valuable time on the proposal. If the bureaucrat chooses to decide about the policy himself, he 
faces two problems that in combination make a clear-cut policy decision difficult. Firstly, the 
bureaucrat  is  not  certain  about  the  policy  option  preferred  by  his  minister.  The  bureaucrat 
believes  that  the  minister  prefers  policy  A  with  probability  a ∈ [0,  1]  and  policy  B  with 
probability 1-a. Furthermore, the bureaucrat is uncertain about whether the minister will become 
aware of the adopted policy or not. With probability p∈ [0, 1], the minister will be informed 
about the adopted policy, and with probability 1-p, she will remain unaware of the policy. The 
minister’s  payoff  in  the  different  scenarios  just  depends  on  which  policy  is  selected  by  the 
bureaucrat. The minister is not involved in negotiations, so the cost term c is always zero. If the 
bureaucrat selects the option favoured by the minister, the minister receives its maximum payoff 
of zero. If the bureaucrat selects the option not favoured by the minister, the minister receives a 
negative payoff of -1. From the point of view of the bureaucrat, the choice of the policy option is 
inconsequential as long as the minister does not know about it. Thus, the bureaucrat receives his 
maximum  payoff  of  zero  whenever  the  minister  remains  unaware  of  the  bureaucrat’s  policy 
choice (then d = 0), whatever that choice may be. In contrast, the payoffs of the bureaucrat mirror 
the  payoffs  of  the  minister  exactly  when  the  latter  scrutinizes  the  formers  decision.  Any 
disagreement about the policy option chosen by the bureaucrat will be directly reflected in his 
payoff. If he chose the minister’s preferred policy option, he will receive a payoff of zero. If he 
chose the option not preferred by the minister, he will receive a payoff of -1. This relationship 
between the bureaucrat’s and the minister’s payoffs represents the idea that the bureaucrat is 
sensitive towards the minister’s evaluation of his job but that this evaluation depends on what the 
minister can actually observe. 
The game can be solved via backward induction. When the bureaucrat refers the proposal 
to the minister, nature reveals which policy the minister prefers and the minister simple selects 
this policy. The minister incurs only decision-making costs resulting from the need to deal with 
the proposal herself. These decision-making costs occur regardless of which policy option the 
minister selected and are directly transferred to the bureaucrat. Thus, the bureaucrat’s payoff for 
referring the proposal is -c. The payoff for deciding about the proposal himself is somewhat more 
difficult to identify. Given the choice for a certain policy option, the bureaucrat’s payoff depends 
on the probability p that the minister becomes aware of the selected policy and on the probability 
a  that  the  selected policy  corresponds to  her  preferred  outcome.  In  general, the  bureaucrat’s   12 
payoff from selecting policy A is p(1-a)(-1) and the payoff from selecting policy B is pa(-1). 
Comparing these two payoffs, the bureaucrat will choose policy A over B if p(1-a)(-1) > pa(-1), 
which reduces to a > 1-a. In words, the bureaucrat will choose policy A if the probability that the 
minister prefers policy A is larger than the probability that the minister prefers policy B. Solving 
for a, we can easily see that this will be the case when a > 0.5. If a > 0.5, then the bureaucrat’s 
choice  between  referring  the  proposal  to  ministers  and  deciding  about  the  proposal  himself 
becomes one between referring and selecting policy A.
5 Formally, the bureaucrat will refer the 
proposal if -c > p(1-a)(-1), which reduces to c < p(1-a). If a < 0.5, then the bureaucrat’s choice 
becomes one between referring and selecting policy B. In this case, the bureaucrat refers the 
proposal if -c > pa(-1), which reduces to c < pa. In both cases, the bureaucrat faces a trade-off 
between the certain costs c of a referral and the losses he is likely to receive in the event that he 
inadvertently does not select the minister’s preferred policy and his policy choice is discovered 
by the minister. For a given level of negotiation costs, the bureaucrat is more likely to refer the 
proposal to the minister the larger the probability that he accidentally selects the policy option not 
favoured by the minister and the larger the probability that the minister subsequently learns about 
his policy choice. Looking at it from a different angle, the bureaucrat will decide to select policy 
himself either if he is relatively sure about which policy is favoured by his superior or if the 
chances that his policy choice will be discovered by the minister are rather small. 
I argue that the bureaucrat’s uncertainty about the minister’s preferred policy choice and 
the bureaucrat’s belief about the probability that the minister will learn the bureaucrat’s policy 
choice  are  both  influenced  by  the  powers  of  the  EP  in  legislative  decision-making.  The 
Parliament is likely to introduce additional issues and more extreme positions (Rittberger 2000; 
Kaeding & Selck 2005; Costello 2008) to those that were deemed relevant by national officials 
when developing their negotiation positions and strategies. Often, these newly introduced issues 
are also of a politically more controversial nature. While such amendments can be ignored under 
the  consultation  procedure,  they  have  to  be  taken  more  seriously  under  the  cooperation  and 
particularly under the codecision procedure, when the Council has to reach a compromise with 
the Parliament. In the face of relatively extreme EP positions or unfamiliar, controversial new 
issues, the bureaucrat will find it more difficult to predict the reaction of his minister (i.e., a will 
be  close  to  0.5).  As  long  as  the  minister  does  not  learn  the  bureaucrat’s  policy  choice,  this 
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uncertainty about the minister’s preference is not consequential. However, a more powerful EP is 
also likely to be taken more seriously by interest groups and the media on both the European and 
national level. The increased interest in the Parliament’s positions by lobbyists and the media 
creates additional channels through which information about the policy choice of the bureaucrat 
can be transmitted to the minister. Thus, the minister is more likely to hear about the bureaucrat’s 
policy choice (i.e. p increases) when the act in question was adopted according to the cooperation 
or codecision procedure rather than the consultation procedure. In short, the involvement of a 
powerful EP in legislative decision-making increases the uncertainty about the preferences of the 
minister and the likelihood that ministers will become aware of the bureaucrat’s policy choice. 
Both of these factors in turn increase the probability that the bureaucrat refers a proposal to the 
minister. Having outlined the linkages between the legislative powers of the EP and the different 
variables determining the decision-making level in the Council, the following hypotheses can be 
stated: 
Hypothesis: Ministers in the Council are more likely to personally decide on a proposal the 
more powers the EP has been granted in the legislative decision-making process. 
Corresponding to the power of the EP in these different procedures,  I expect to observe the 
lowest degree of ministerial involvement under the consultation procedure, the second-lowest 
under the cooperation procedure and the highest under the codecision procedure.
6 In the next 
section, I examine the extent to which these expectations are borne out by the data. 
Sample selection, data collection and measurement 
I extracted the data used for this analysis from the European Commission’s Prelex database. 
Prelex  monitors  the  inter-institutional decision-making  process  and  is accessible online.
7  The 
database  provides  information  on  all  Commission  documents  submitted  to  the  other  EU 
institutions  since  the  mid  1970s.  For  legislative proposals, the  database  tracks  their  progress 
through  the  inter-institutional  decision-making  process,  providing  a  considerable  amount  of 
                                                 
6 In the theoretical literature, disagreement exists about whether the cooperation procedure or the first version of the 
codecision procedure as introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht was more beneficial for Parliament. However, a 
consensus exists that the second version of the codecision procedure, which has been formally introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, grants more powers to the EP than the cooperation procedure. As mentioned earlier, the second 
version of the codecision procedure was effectively already in operation under the rules of the Maastricht Treaty.  
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en   14 
information on major  events related to the dossier, like EP plenary or Council meetings. To 
extract  the  information  from  the  database’s  webpages,  I  developed  a  computer  script  in  the 
programming language Python. The script first searches for all Commission documents that were 
submitted in a certain year and downloads the respective webpages. In a second step, the relevant 
information in the webpages is identified through search functions and copied into a database 
table.  
The data analysis focuses on decision-making processes that started after 1974 and ended 
between the beginning of 1980 and the end of 2007. I also restrict the analysis to proposals for 
decisions,  regulations  and  directives  that  were  introduced  by  the  Commission  and  discussed 
under the consultation, cooperation, or codecision procedure. The focus on decisions, regulations, 
and  directives  excludes  several  types  of  non-legislative  acts.  To  keep  the  sample  somewhat 
homogenous, I do not consider legislative proposals introduced by a member state or by the 
European  Central  Bank.  In  cases  where  direct  information  on  the  legislative  procedure  was 
missing,  I  relied  on  the occurrence  of  different  types  of  EP  meetings  to  code  the procedure 
variable.
8 Finally, I excluded proposals if evidence suggested that the legislative procedure had 
changed  during  the  decision-making  process due to  changes in  the  Treaty.  How  to  code  the 
procedure variable is ambiguous in such cases. This selection procedure resulted in a sample of 
6,245 decision-making processes. The distribution of different types of procedures included in 
the sample is given in Table 1. With almost 78 percent, the vast majority of decision-making 
proposals  followed  the  consultation  procedure.  Another  8  percent  were  decided  under  the 
cooperation procedure and about 14 percent under the codecision procedure.  
Table 1: Distribution of types of legislative procedures 
Legislative procedure  Freq.  Percent 
Consultation procedure  4,865  77.9 
Cooperation procedure  491  7.9 
Codecision procedure  889  14.2 
Total  6,245  100.00 
 
                                                 
8 I coded proposals that involved an “EP opinion single reading” as consultation files and proposals that involved an 
“EP opinion first reading” as cooperation or codecision files. Drawing the distinction between cooperation and 
codecision files required individually inspecting each proposal. I assumed that cases that do not indicate the type of 
legislative procedure and do not record any EP meetings relate to non-legislative acts.   15 
Figure  2  shows  the  distribution  of  different  types  of  procedures  over  time.  Before  1987, all 
decision-making  processes  followed  the  consultation  procedure.  As  the  Single  European  Act 
came into force in 1987, the cooperation procedure was added. The Maastricht Treaty introduced 
the codecision procedure in 1993, which almost completely replaced the cooperation procedure 
after its scope of applicability was considerably enlarged by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. 
Figure 2: Distribution of types of legislative procedures over time 
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I measure the politicization of Council decision-making by a dummy variable indicating whether 
or  not  ministers  personally  decided  on  the  dossier.  The  analysis  focuses  on  the  first  formal 
Council  decision  in  the  procedure.  In  the  case  of  the  consultation  procedure,  this  decision 
coincides  with  the  final  adoption  of  the  act.  In  the  case  of  the  cooperation  and  codecision 
procedure, the first formal Council decision refers to the adoption of  the Council’s common 
position in the first reading stage of these procedures. In both instances, the first formal Council 
decision reflects the collective view to which member states agree.
9 Thus, the focus on the first 
                                                 
9  The  exception  occurs  when  the  Parliament  and  the  Council  reach  an  early  agreement  under  the  codecision 
procedure. Then the Council’s first decision reflects the compromise between the Parliament and the Council. The 
Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of first reading agreements in 1999.   16 
formal Council decision maximizes the comparability of the cases. The meeting in which the 
ministers  formally  adopt  the  proposal  or  the  common  position  is  often  preceded  by  another 
meeting in which the ministers reached the substantive agreement on the dossier.
10 If ministers 
discussed the proposal in such a meeting or in the meeting in which the first formal decision was 
made, the politicization variable is coded as 1. If the proposal was not discussed in any of the 
Council meetings leading up to the first formal decision, the variable is coded as 0.  
A proposal that is to be discussed by ministers is indicated as a B-item on the ministers’ 
meeting agenda. If ministers just endorse the decision made by one of the working parties or 
Coreper without deliberation, then the proposal is indicated as an A-item on the agenda. In many 
cases, Prelex includes information on what type of item a proposal formed on the ministers’ 
agenda. Unfortunately, information on the type of agenda-item is missing particularly often for 
meetings in which the Council reached a substantive agreement on the proposal. In such cases, 
assuming that the proposal formed a B-item on the agenda seems reasonable. If a substantive 
agreement is reached at lower levels of the Council, no need exists for ministers to endorse the 
agreement informally before adopting the proposal or common position in a subsequent meeting. 
This assumption is also plausible from an empirical point of view. The overwhelming majority of 
meetings at which ministers adopted a substantive agreement and for which information on the 
type  of  agenda-item  is  available  indeed  indicate  that  the  proposal  formed  a  B-item  on  the 
agenda.
11 Thus, I coded proposals for which Prelex specifies that ministers reached an agreement 
but lacks information on the type of agenda-item as B-items. Similarly, for meetings in which the 
ministers adopted the formal Council decision but information on the agenda-item was missing, I 
assumed that the decision was adopted without discussion as an A-item. Again, the large majority 
of cases on which information about the type of agenda-item was available showed that ministers 
usually  make  the  formal  adoption  decision  through  the  A-item  procedure.
12  I  also  coded 
adoptions  through  written  procedure,  replacements  or  withdrawals  of  the  proposal  by  the 
Commission  before  any  ministerial  meeting  had  been  taken  place  as  a  lack  of  ministerial 
                                                 
10 In Prelex, the events referring to these meetings are called ‘Council agreement’ and ‘Political agreement common 
position’, respectively. 
11 86 percent in the case of agreements on final acts and 91 percent in the case of agreements on common positions. 
12 Ministers took more than 82 percent of the formal adoption decisions as A-items. In general, Prelex included 
information  on  the  type  of  agenda-item  for  most  formal  adoption  events.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  the  substantive 
agreement events, the need for imputing values was very low in these instances.   17 
involvement. Table 2 describes the distribution of the politicization variable. About 60 percent of 
the studied decision-making processes did not directly involve ministers at all. Ministers were 
actively involved in only  about 37 percent of the cases.  In about 3 percent of the  cases, no 
information on the outcome of the decision-making process was available yet. These cases will 
be excluded from the subsequent analysis.
13 
Table 2: Distribution of agenda-items of ministerial meetings 
Agenda-item  Freq.  Percent 
A-Item  3,751  60.1 
B-Item  2,328  37.3 
Pending  166  2.7 
Total  6,245  100.00 
 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of proposals that the ministers dealt with as B-items over time. A 
first surprising observation is the large variation in the degree of ministerial involvement, ranging 
between 6 percent in 1980 and 66 percent in 1990. The figure also indicates that his variability is 
not just due to differences in legislative workload. One could assume that a larger number of 
adopted proposals goes hand in hand with a lower proportion of these proposals discussed by 
ministers, but the opposite seems to be the case. The more proposals the Council adopts during a 
certain year, the more of them are decided by ministers. The lack of a clear-cut trend in the 
degree of ministerial involvement also comes as a surprise. This finding stands in contrast to 
recent work arguing that EU policy-making is increasingly politicized (e.g. Hooghe & Marks 
2009). At least with respect to Council decision-making, such a development is not visible. If at 
all,  the  data  show  a  hump  of  increased  ministerial  involvement  during  the  drive  for  the 
completion of the internal market in the early 1990s, which has steadily levelled off since then. 
Recent years have seen a move towards less politicization in the Council. 
                                                 
13 Given their relatively low number, the exclusion of these observations is unlikely to cause any substantial selection 
bias.   18 
Figure  3:  Proportion  of  proposals discussed  by  ministers  and  the  total  number of  completed 
decision-making processes over time 
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This paper is not primarily concerned with describing changes in ministerial involvement over 
time. Nor does it aim at a full and complete explanation of these historical changes. The primary 
aim is to examine the causal effect of one particular factor, the legislative powers of the EP, on 
ministerial  involvement  in  Council  decision-making.  In  the  next  section,  I  investigate  this 
relationship. 
The effect of EP empowerment on the politicization of Council decision-making 
Cross-tabulating  the  legislative  procedure  with  the  ministerial  agenda-item  variable,  Table  4 
indicates clear differences in politicization across procedures. Over the entire sample, ministers 
were involved in 38 percent of all decision-making processes. Under consultation, ministers were 
directly  involved  in  decision-making  in  only  35  percent  of  the  cases.  In  contrast,  ministers 
decided on 47 percent of the codecision cases and on about 61 percent of the cooperation cases. 
These findings are generally in line with the theoretical argument that EP empowerment increases 
the  politicization  of  Council  decision-making.  However,  given  my  more  specific  theoretical 
expectations, the larger involvement of ministers under the cooperation procedure as compared to   19 
the codecision procedure is somewhat surprising. This finding is most likely due to the generally 
high involvement of ministers in the early 1990s, when the codecision procedure had not been 
introduced yet and much legislation was still adopted through the cooperation procedure. The 
multivariate  analysis  shows  that  the  findings  are  completely  in  line  with  the  theoretical 
expectations after controlling for time-specific effects.  
Table 4: Legislative procedure vs. ministerial involvement 
  Agenda-item   
Legislative 
procedure 
A-item  B-item  Total 
Consultation  3,125  1,648  4,773 
  (65.5)  (34.5)  (100.0) 
Cooperation  194  297  491 
  (39.5)  (60.5)  (100.0) 
Codecision  432  383  815 
  (53.0)  (47.0)  (100.0) 
Total  3,751  2,328  6,079 
  (61.7)  (38.3)  (100.0) 
 
The figures in the previous section indicated that the politicization of Council decision-making 
actually decreased over time as more and more powers and competences were transferred to the 
Parliament. At first sight, this development contradicts the theoretical expectations. However, 
these  figures  are  based  on  aggregate  data.  Figure  3  demonstrates  that  the  overall  level  of 
politicization  decreased  over  time,  but  it  does  not  indicate  the  differences  in  politicization 
between different legislative procedures. Figure 4 is more useful for an initial evaluation of the 
theoretical  expectations.  The upper  part  of  the  figure  compares  the  percentage  of  politicized 
Council  decisions  under  the  cooperation  procedure  to  the  percentage  of  politicized  Council 
decisions under the consultation procedure. As expected, the differences in the percentages are 
mostly positive. Except for the years 1990 and 1992
14, the percentage of politicized Council 
decisions under cooperation was always considerably higher than the percentage of politicized 
Council decisions under codecision. This pattern is even more visible in the lower part of Figure 
4, which compares the politicization under the codecision procedure to the politicization under 
the consultation procedure. Here, the differences in the percentages are consistently positive over 
                                                 
14 The negative differences in percentages for the years 1999 and 2005 are both based on only a single cooperation 
procedure case. Therefore, any conclusions based on these numbers would be extremely weak.   20 
the  entire  time  period.  Thus,  the  bivariate  analysis  is  consistent  with  the  hypotheses.  The 
statistical analysis below further explores the robustness of these bivariate relationships. 
Figure 4: Differences in politicization over time 
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Notes: Bars indicate the difference between procedures in the percentage of politicized Council decisions in a certain 
year. The top part of the figure compares the percentage of politicized Council decisions under cooperation to the 
percentage under consultation. The bottom part compares the percentage of politicized decisions under codecision to 
the percentage under consultation. The numbers at the lower end of each bar indicate the number of observations on 
which the percentages for the cooperation and codecision procedure are based.  
 
The statistical analysis employs logistic regression to estimate the effect of different procedures 
on  the  probability  of  ministers  being  directly  involved  in  Council  decision-making  and  to 
examine this relationship while controlling for time- and policy-specific factors. Table 5 presents 
the results of the analysis. Model 1 includes only two dummy variables for the cooperation and   21 
codecision  procedure,  respectively.  Thus,  the  consultation  procedure  acts  as  the  baseline  or 
comparison category. Model 2 also includes 27 dummy variables indicating the different years in 
which the decision-making process ended.
15 These dummy variables account for period-specific 
factors that affected all decision-making processes in a similar manner during a certain year. 
Model 3 controls for policy-specific effects. Based on the information given in Prelex on the 
‘field  of  activity’,  I  coded  a  policy  field  variable  distinguishing  21  different  policy  fields.
16 
Unfortunately, information on the policy field  was missing for some cases, so the sample is 
somewhat smaller when the policy field dummy variables are included in the analysis. Finally, 
model 4 includes controls for both the year in which the decision-making process ended and for 
the policy field. Since the estimated coefficients for the control variables are not of substantive 
interest, I do not report them below. To ease interpretation, the entries in Table 5 present the odds 
ratios rather than the estimated regression coefficients.  
Table 5: Estimation results for logistic regression analysis of ministerial involvement, 1980-2007 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Cooperation procedure  2.88  1.86  3.37  2.31 
  (10.87)*  (5.96)*  (11.05)*  (7.05)* 
Codecision procedure  1.68  3.23  2.41  3.74 
  (6.77)*  (11.89)*  (9.44)*  (11.58)* 
27 year dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
21 policy dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.02  0.10  0.06  0.13 
Observations  6079  6079  5796  5796 
Notes: * significant at 1%; the dependent variable is ministerial involvement with 1 indicating that ministers made 
the Council decision themselves and 0 that they just rubber-stamped a decision reached by a preparatory body; 
entries are odds ratios with the absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
 
All the results reported in Table 5 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, we can 
almost be certain that the null hypothesis of no relationship between the explanatory and the 
response variable is incorrect in these instances. Thus, in the following, the interpretation of the 
regression results focuses on the estimated effect sizes and the substantive significance of the 
different  explanatory  variables.  In  general,  all  the  estimation  results  reported  in  Table  5  are 
                                                 
15 The year 1980 was arbitrarily chosen as the baseline category. 
16 If proposals were related to several policy fields, I classified them as being part of the ‘multiple policy fields’ 
category. This category formed the baseline category in the regression analysis.   22 
broadly  consistent with  the theoretical argument that the empowerment  of the EP leads to  a 
politicization of Council decision-making. The results indicate that the odds of ministers deciding 
on the dossier are at least 1.8 times (Model 2) higher under the cooperation procedure than under 
the  consultation  procedure.  Similarly,  the  odds  of  ministers  becoming  involved  under  the 
codecision procedure are at least 1.7 times (Model 1) higher than under consultation procedure. 
The estimation results without control variables (Model 1) are somewhat puzzling as they 
again indicate that the cooperation procedure has a stronger effect on the politicization of Council 
decision-making  than  the  codecision  procedure.  However,  if  the  analysis  controls  for  time-
specific  effects  as  in  Model  2,  the  effect  sizes  of  the  different  procedure  variables  take  the 
theoretically  expected  order.  Given  the  fact  that  some  legislative  procedures  are  far  more 
prevalent in certain time periods than others, the change in the estimation results caused by the 
inclusion of dummy variables for different years is not surprising.
17 Interestingly, the inclusion of 
policy  field  control  variables  accentuates  the  estimated  effects  of  the  legislative  procedure 
variables. Again, without time dummies, the effect of the cooperation procedure seems larger 
than the effect of the codecision procedure (Model 3). However, the order of the effect sizes 
reverses as  soon  as  control  variables  for time-specific effects  are  introduced  (Model  4).  The 
estimation  results  for  the  full  specification  of  Model  4  indicates  that,  compared  to  the 
consultation procedure, the odds of ministers becoming involved in Council decision-making are 
2.3  times  higher  under  the  cooperation  procedure and 3.7  times  higher  under  the  codecision 
procedure. As the different model specifications show, the exact numerical sizes of the estimated 
effects are not very stable. However, all of them are of substantial size, and when the appropriate 
control variables are included, the order of the magnitude of the different effects is also in line 
with theoretical expectations.  
In order to further investigate the influence of different time periods and to check the 
robustness of the findings, I conduct a number of sub-sample analyses. I divide the sample in 
three different Treaty regime periods. The first period ranges from 1987 to 1992 and covers the 
                                                 
17 A logistic regression analysis of the politicization variable without imputed values yields the expected order of 
effect  sizes  even  without  any  control  variables.  Although  the  imputation  of  values  affects  the  results  of  the 
descriptive analysis reported in the tables and figures in this paper, the substantive conclusions about the effect of EP 
involvement on the politicization of Council decision-making are unaffected. In fact, the results of a correlational 
analysis that does not rely on imputed values on the dependent variable lend even stronger support to the theoretical 
expectations.    23 
period  governed  by  the  Treaty  rules  as  amended  by  the  Single  European  Act.  Only  the 
consultation and cooperation procedure were in use during this period. The second period ranges 
from 1993 to 1998. This period is exceptional in that all three legislative procedures were in use 
during that time
18. The last period covers the years from 1999 to 2007. The Amsterdam Treaty in 
1999  almost  completely  replaced  the  cooperation  procedure  by  the  codecision  procedure. 
Therefore, this sub-sample analysis focuses on a comparison of the effects of the consultation and 
codecision procedure. The estimation results are given in Table 6. Regression results based on 
models including time dummies are almost identical to those reported below. Estimates based on 
models with policy control variables indicate even stronger effects for the legislative procedure 
variables. For simplicity, I report only the results based on models without time and policy field 
dummy variables. 
Table 6: Estimation results for the sub-sample analysis of different time periods 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 1c 
Cooperation procedure  1.67  2.60   
  (4.09)*  (5.52)*   
Codecision procedure    3.67  2.79 
    (7.64)*  (8.97)* 
Pseudo R
2  0.01  0.04  0.04 
Time period  1987-1992  1993-1998  1999-2007 
Observations  1685  1401  1611 
Notes: * significant at 1%; the dependent variable is ministerial involvement with 1 indicating that ministers made 
the Council decision themselves and 0 that they just rubber-stamped a decision reached by a preparatory body; 
entries are odds ratios with the absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
 
The results of the sub-sample analysis are also consistent with the theoretical argument. In the 
pre-Maastricht  period  (Model  1a),  the  cooperation  procedure  is  associated  with  more 
involvement of ministers than the consultation procedure. The effect of the cooperation procedure 
is even larger after 1993 (Model 1b), but now the newly introduced codecision procedure is even 
more consequential for the politicization of Council decision-making. After the changes brought 
about by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Model 1c), the effect of the codecision procedure weakens 
somewhat but is still substantially significant. In summary, the analysis demonstrated a strong 
and robust relationship between the type of legislative procedure and the decision-making level in 
                                                 
18 The cooperation procedure still applies in a few, very limited policy areas after 1998. However, the extremely low 
extent of usage makes this procedure practically irrelevant for comparative purposes in the post-Amsterdam period.   24 
the Council. Stronger powers of the EP are associated with more involvement of ministers in 
Council  decision-making.  In  this  respect,  the  empirical  findings  are  clearly  in  line  with  the 
theoretical  expectations.  In  the  next  section,  I  summarize  the  study  and  discuss  possible 
normative conclusions. 
Conclusions 
A considerable body of research exists on the working of the EP and its influence on policy 
outcomes  under  different  legislative  procedures. However,  few  studies  consider  the  effect  of 
differences in inter-institutional procedures on intra-institutional decision-making processes. This 
paper sheds some light on the consequences of the EP’s empowerment on the politicization of 
decision-making  within  the  Council.  Often,  working  parties  and  committees  composed  of 
officials representing their national governments exclusively deal with a proposal; ministers only 
rubber-stamp their decision. I argued that the empowerment of the EP through the introduction of 
the  cooperation  and  codecision  procedures  leads  to  more  direct  involvement  of  ministers  in 
Council decision-making. These procedures grant the EP sufficient powers to make sure that its 
views are seriously considered by political actors and the media. 
I presented a theoretical model of the ‘typical’ Council bureaucrat’s referral decision and 
showed that the bureaucrat is more likely to refer a decision to his superior if he is uncertain 
about the minister’s policy preferences and if he believes the minister might learn his policy 
choice after the  fact. The involvement of the  EP affects both of these factors. Often the EP 
introduces  new  issues  or  promotes  extreme  positions.  The  bureaucrat  will  find  it  hard  to 
anticipate his minister’s views in such situations. Also, the involvement of the EP is likely to 
draw more public and political attention to a dossier, thus increasing the chance that the minister 
learns about the bureaucrat’s policy choice if the bureaucrat decided against a referral to the 
minister. If the bureaucrat did not select the most preferred policy of his superior, the minister 
reprimands the bureaucrat when she learns about his policy choice. Of course, the bureaucrat 
would like to avoid such consequences and is therefore more likely to refer the proposal to the 
minister for a decision. In line with the degree of EP power under different legislative procedures, 
I expected the cooperation procedure and the codecision procedure to be associated with a higher 
degree of politicization than the consultation procedure. Furthermore, the effect of the codecision 
procedure was expected to be larger than the effect of the cooperation procedure.    25 
The empirical analysis relied on a sample of about 6000 decision-making cases recorded 
in the European Commission’s online database Prelex. The sample included all decision-making 
processes that concerned the adoption of a regulation, decision, or directive, and which were 
discussed according to the consultation, cooperation, or codecision procedure. The sample was 
also restricted to decision-making processes initialized by a Commission proposal and to cases 
that did not change the legislative procedure during the decision-making process. The statistical 
analysis  identified  a  strong  and  clear  relationship  between  the  legislative  procedure  and  the 
Council decision-making level. The analysis also confirmed the further implication about the 
stronger effect of the EP under the codecision than under the cooperation procedure.  
From a normative point of view, the granting of legislative powers to the EP is often 
justified by referring to the reduction of the alleged democracy deficit of the EU. Establishing the 
Parliament as a co-legislator next to the Council is supposed to create a direct link between the 
institutions and the people of the EU, as the Parliament is the only body whose members are 
directly elected by citizens. Whether the EP really fulfils these high hopes is questionable as long 
as European elections are just second-order national elections determined by domestic issues. 
However, this study has pointed to a secondary effect of EP empowerment with consequences for 
the legitimacy of EU decision-making. The study showed that a powerful EP also leads to more 
ministerial  involvement  in  the  other  main  legislative  institution  of  the  EU,  the  Council  of 
Ministers. As a result, accountability in the other, ‘territorial’ channel of interest representation is 
strengthened. When the Parliament has real legislative powers, Council decisions are less often 
made in obscure committee meetings by largely anonymous bureaucrats. National legislatures 
can more easily monitor and control the actions of their government ministers than the actions of 
relatively low-ranking bureaucrats that operate outside the limelight. But of course, the stronger 
politicization  of  Council  decision-making  also  has  its  negative  effects.  Officials  from  the 
Council’s secretariat are concerned that national officials in preparatory bodies are less and less 
inclined ‘to take responsibility’ and that they tend to refer even minor issues to ministers.
19 As a 
result,  the  agendas  of  ministerial  meetings  are  often  cluttered  up  with  issues  of  secondary 
importance.  This  loss  in  efficiency  is  the  flip-side  of  an  increased  politicization  of  Council 
decision-making.  Finding  the  right  balance  between  accountability  and  efficiency  in  Council 
decision-making will largely determine the perceived legitimacy of its decisions. 
                                                 
19 Personal communication with official from Council Secretariat (September 2008); see also Nilsson (2004: 135).   26 
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